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The focus of this thesis is the derivation of the American jury system from 
the English jury of Henry II. To this end, a short history of English law and the 
history of the development of the English jury is given. The method of the 
English jury's development is used to show the evolution of the early American 
jury into the American jury of today. 
The American jury still resembles the English jury from which it evolved. 
The American system has a grand jury to indict criminals and a petit jury to try the 
case. The practice of taking an oath was begun by the English jurors and is still in 
practice in American today as well as the challenging of potential jurors for bias. 
The American system differs from the juries of old in its inability to determine 
matters of law and in its move away from unanimity in verdicts and the twelve-
man Jury. 
Some of the aspects of the historical English jury are still in use in the 
Americanjury system of today, but some differences have been created through 
case law and legislation. It will come to no surprise, however, that the most 
important characteristics of the historical English jury are still present in the 
American system today. 
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The American jury system has been under attack by the public in the last 
several years because of the unpopular verdicts handed down in cases such as the 
Rodney King beating by several Los Angeles police officers and the acquittal of 
O.J. Simpson, who was charged with murdering his ex-wife and her boyfriend. 
These decisions, and others, have caused people to question whether the jury 
system still works and what reforms could possibly be made to improve it. Even 
with all of the negative reactions to jury verdicts and calls for reform, chances are 
very good that any critic of the system faced with criminal prosecution himself 
would not be lax to thank the English for this wondrous phenomenon called trial 
by jury. It is this topic that will be addressed in this paper--how the present-day 
American jury system derived from the English jury, focusing specifically on the 
areas of impartiality, fact-finding, and unanimity in verdicts. 
As was implied above, the jury system developed in England. The jury was 
not used often until the 12th century, but it made its appearance with the Norman 
invaders. To understand the development of the jury and what it means for 
America today, it is necessary to understand what was happening to the legal 
system in England during this time period. With this in mind, it is necessary to 
1 
visit England at the time of the Norman Conquest in 1066. 
At the time of the Norman Conquest of England, there was no central court 
which regularly administered law that was common to the whole country. 
"English law was, for the most part, administered in many local courts; and the 
law thus administered was the customary law of the district" (Holdsworth, vol. 1, 
p.3). These local courts were very diverse and had different roles and 
responsibilities to fulfill. 
From the last half of the 10th century the country was divided into shires 
(counties), hundreds, wards, and vills (townships) with each of these categories 
being smaller in population size than the one previous. The county and the 
hundred were jurisdictional units that each had its own court. The vills or 
townships were responsible for various public duties. In particular within the vill 
was a phenomenon called the tithing which was responsible for producing 
criminals before the court. These different types of communal (local) courts each 
had their own peculiarities and jurisdictions (Baker 11). 
As was previously mentioned, at the time of the conquest, all of England 
was divided into shires, or counties. In the 10th century the officials of the shire 
were the earl dorman, the bishop, and the sheriff. The earldorman was the chief 
official of the shire, but soon they as a class began to diminish in numbers. They 
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thus used their power and influence to gain control of the provinces. After the 
Norman Conquest, the "earl" was relegated to a mere title with no real power to 
rule within the province. Also after the Conquest, the bishop lost a lot of power 
within the courts due to the severance of the spheres of lay and ecclesiastical 
jurisdictions. This left the sheriff as the chief official of the shire after the 
Conquest (Holdsworth vol. 1, p. 10-11). 
The sheriff was responsible for enforcement of the king's fiscal rights and 
for fulfilling his military police and judicial duties in connection with the shire. 
The sheriffs court--the county court--was the governing body of the county. In it 
administrative, military, and financial business was carried out. "Charters made 
by private persons were often read before it; and royal command and enactments 
of the king and Witan were there proclaimed" (Holdsworth, vol. 1, p. 17). The 
court had general jurisdiction over all kinds of cases: criminal actions, pleas of the 
crown, lord and tenant disputes, actions for various wrongs, and actions for debt. 
This court can thus be seen as the most important agent for making and declaring 
English law before the rise of the central courts. 
The hundred court was a smaller division of the county court. This court 
met more often than the county court and had a special responsibility for finding 
murderers. The official of the hundred was known as the hundred-reeve and was 
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usually a bailiff or deputy of the sheriff ( shire-reeve). The jurisdiction of the 
court--like the county court--was general, but with the growth of the frankpledge 
system, it became more civil and business oriented in nature. 
The frankpledge system can be defined as "a system of compulsory 
collective bail tixed for individuals, not after their arrest for crime, but as a 
safeguard in anticipation of it" (Holdsworth, vol. 1, p. 13). Within this system, 
tithings were set up to insure mutual responsibility for the local unit. Throughout 
England, all persons, unless excused by reason of their rank or the amount of 
property that they held, had to be enrolled in a tithing group. This group consisted 
often men and was presided over by a tithing man. Notice of a crime was given 
to a hundred through the county court. The hundred-reeve then reported the crime 
to his tithing-men. It was then the responsibility of the tithing-men within the 
hundred to find the criminal. If one of the ten men in a particular tithing 
committed an offense, it was the duty of the other nine men to present him for trial 
before the court. If they failed to present the culprit, they would be required to 
pay for the damage, or crime, that the man had committed as well as pay a fine for 
not producing the offender. In this way, police duties in the district were placed 
upon the tithings (Holdsworth vol. 1, p. 14-15). 
Although these courts differed from one another and had different 
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responsibilities, one thing is true: the greatest part of the judicial and 
administrative work of the government in the Anglo-Saxon period was done in 
these local courts. The king and his Witan, the assembly of the leading men of the 
nation, did at times exercise wide legislative, judicial, and executive powers, but it 
was not until after the Norman Conquest that a strong central authority was 
developed to rival the local courts. 
The communal, local courts have been discussed in detail, but no mention 
has yet been made of the judges of these courts. The sheriffs and hundred-reeves 
were not the judges but the administrators, or presidents, of these courts. The 
judges were men called suitors. As both the county and hundred courts were 
general jurisdiction, it seems reasonable that either court could be called upon to 
administer justice in a case. This did not seem to be true. 
It was only if a person could not get justice in the 
hundred court that he sued in the county court; and 
it was only if a person could not get justice in the 
county court that he brought his case before the king 
and Witan. Hence it happened that the greater courts 
were courts for the greater men, and the smaller 
courts for the smaller men. The difference between 
them was in the kind of suitors who attended them, 
not in the extent of jurisdiction which they exercised 
(Holdsworth, vol. 1, p. 9). 
Though in practice the regular attendants at the county court were the most 
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important men, in theory it was composed of an extremely varied group of 
persons. 
Attendance at the court was seen as a burdensome duty to many 
participants. It was similar to the duty of military service to some individuals. 
The duty of suit came to be attached to landholders and was a real property asset 
in that suit (or portions ofa suit) were sold with the sale of property. As was 
mentioned, these suitors were the judges of the courts. This was based on the 
principle that a person should be judged by his peers who were residents in the 
same locality as the accused. It was also a system of majority rule in the courts--
-- unanimity between the judges was unnecessary. Many legal scholars mark the 
-
beginning of English law from the Norman Conquest. The Normans did not 
impose a whole new body of law upon the English when they took over. In fact, 
William the Conqueror was anxious to project himself as the legal successor to 
King Edward the Confessor. Probably the biggest influence that the Norman 
Conquest had on the English system of law was the introduction of a strong 
kingship. 
The common law of England was produced by centralizing 
justice, and was the law used by the royal judges throughout 
the realm. Although the later English kings had ruled the 
entire country, they had done little to impose a central 
administration. The Normans brought few new laws to 
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England, but they brought a stronger view of kingship 
and a genius for administration (Baker 5). 
The development of common law and centralization has been attributed to Henry 
II rather than William I, but one can wonder whether any of Henry II's 
accomplishments would have been possible without the Norman influence of a 
strong central government. 
The Crown was seen as the highest law of the land and with it came the 
responsibility to administer justice. There are obvious limits to what anyone 
person can do, and it seems that the Crown traditionally only reviewed special 
cases that caught its interest. Common, everyday matters belonged to the county 
and hundred courts. The Norman influence caused the original jurisdiction of the 
crown to increase, and subsequent kings increased the control that they had over 
the central government. Probably one of the biggest innovations that helped to 
create the central government and common law was the development of the idea 
of delegation. 
The notion that a royal agent, an iusticiarius, could 
transact business and exercise powers of the judicature 
which belonged to the king's own person, made 
possible the common law judicial system. The 
unifying effect brought about by the employment of a 
nucleus of professional, or at any rate habitual, 
iusticiarii, produced, within two centuries of Norman 
Conquest, a central system of law (Baker 19). 
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A couple of reasons have been given for this move towards delegation. The 
first reason for the development of delegation, politics, is not all that surprising. 
The power of the sheriff within the shire was immense. The sheriffs were officers 
of the Crown and had thus been able to wield a lot of power within the 
community, power that they had often used for their own benefit. The Crown did 
not want to have to compete with the sheriff for power within the shires. Another 
reason for the move towards delegation centered upon the idea of the "pleas of the 
Crown." These pleas made by the people were matters of particular interest to the 
Crown, such as public order (Baker 20). Effective criminal justice was a goal of 
the Crown--especially when revenues could be increased by the imposition of 
fines for criminal acts. Finally, royal justice may have moved towards delegation 
in order to better serve the people in the matters of common pleas. People often 
felt harassed by the local criminal judges yet needed a means of attaining justice in 
private matters between themselves and local citizens. Royal courts seemed to be 
the answer to these problems. "Royal justice triumphed not because a conscious 
effort was made to impose it on the country, but because it was inherently better 
than the alternatives" (Baker 21). 
At first royal justice meant that certain royal officials received permanent 
appointments as "justiciars of pleas concerning the Crown" (Baker 21) in a county 
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or group of counties. This plan of locally-based royal justices did not last long, 
because these justices were susceptible to the same corruptions as the sheriffs. 
Instead, another way of securing royal justice was needed. Royal justice was 
secured by sending officials from the royal household out into the counties as 
traveling justices. 
This proved more efficient, because the traveling 
judges formed a nucleus of iusticiarii, who had no 
local roots, and could be organized under Henry II 
to tour the whole realm and hear pleas of the 
Crown (Baker 21). 
This idea seems Norman in origin and is reminiscent of the Domesday Inquest 
(1086) where representatives were sent out to look after the king's interests. 
Under Henry II (1154-1189) the judges were sent out on circuits where they heard 
pleas from local courts. These king's representatives were called "iusticae 
errantes (wandering justices) or iusticarii in itinere Gustices in eyre)" (Baker 22). 
In their entirety these justices were a part of the Curia Regis. The justices 
of the Curia Regis were a special group from within the king's advisors whom he 
chose to represent his interests throughout the land and should not be confused 
with the group of advisors known as the Witan. 
The phrase Curia Regis is often used to describe 
the nebulous group of followers which later 
became the King's Council and (with represent-
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atives from shires and burroughs) Parliament. 
This Curia was not merely a judicial court. It 
was central only in the sense that it followed 
the king: the center was not static (Baker 22). 
The Curia Regis in many ways was similar to the Witan--the assembly of the 
leading men of the nation. The king determined the composition of both groups, 
and the people who were regular attendants on the Curia Regis circuit were the 
same kind of people who attended the Witan. In fact, the Witan was the central 
court, composed of the most important men in the nation, that transacted all of the 
government's business before the Norman Conquest. The Curia Regis, as the 
King's Council after the Conquest, was not a law court at all, but a body of 
advisors to which the iusticiarii, among others, belonged. 
Some of these justices traveled with the king and heard cases before him or 
in his stead. These justices became known as coram rege. These justices 
sometimes heard cases outside the presence of the king, but because they still 
traveled with him in his court, they were known as coram rege (with the king). 
Another group of the Curia Regis justices were known as in banco (on the Bench) 
justices. These justices were still royal justices, but they heard matters in the 
absence of the king in a fixed place. "The establishment of a stationary royal 
court, which suitors knew where to find notwithstanding the king's whereabouts, 
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marks the origin of the traditional judicial system of England" (Baker 23). The 
idea of a fixed court, or Bench, certainly took root in the time of Henry II and was 
essential when he and his successor Richard I were absent from England for 
prolonged periods of time. In this way, only through delegation of power could 
justice continue to be carried out in the king's absence. The Bench was not a 
separate court from the other royal courts nor did it have its own jurisdiction; it 
was simply the Curia Regis justices that convened in banco rather than coram 
rege. 
In 1209 when King John permanently returned to England from the 
continent, the Bench was allowed to fade away, and its work was done by the 
justices of the coram rege. This was changed, however, by the Magna Carta 1215, 
chapter 17 statement. In this chapter, common pleas were declared to no longer 
follow the king but would be held in a fixed place (which became Westminster 
Hall). The Bench later became known as the "Common Bench" or "Bench of 
Common Pleas" because of the statement within the Magna Carta which set the 
Bench's jurisdiction as the sole hearer of common pleas. 
These itinerant justices and, finally, bench justices would soon become 
more popular and more powerful than the traditional local courts. In fact, courts 
of royal justice either eventually took over local courts or simply replaced them. 
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Common law and king's law were thus in England to stay. It was this common 
law, and the ability to amass the body of law as it was created in a centralized 
way, that caused the jury system to develop into the system of today. Without the 
centralization that the common law and Henry II brought to pass, the jury system 
as it is known today may never have come into existence. 
Along with the strong kingship and centralized government, there was one 
final important institution that the Normans introduced into English law: the 
Carlovingian inquisitio system. The Carlovingian (Carolingian) kings were 
Frankish rulers who conquered and ruled Byzantine Italy from A.D.774-887 . 
. - These Carlovingian kings, imitating a procedure of the Roman fiscus, assumed the 
privilege of determining their rights by means of an inquisition (Holdsworth vol. 
-
1, p. 312). This inquisitio system required members of a community to supply to 
the Crown any information that was requested concerning the administration of 
the government. "Such information might be required either for purposes of a 
pending litigation, or to supply information upon such matters as the detection of 
crime or the misconduct of officials" (Holdsworth, vol. 1, p. 312). The Frankish 
rulers, content with the workings of this new system, implemented the inquisitio in 
areas of present-day Germany and France. The Carlovingian institution survived 
in the provinces that the Normans conquered and was utilized by the Norman 
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dukes. These dukes were the ones who introduced the inquisitio system to 
England. It is this institution from which the English jury springs. 
Before there were juries as they are known today, there was a system of 
justice known as proofs. A matter was taken to a court, and the justice would 
make a decision. After the decision was made for one party or the other, the judge 
would then ask the "winning" party of the case to give his proof. In this way, the 
proofwas preceded by, and was an attempt to fulfill, the judgment. This proof 
was shown in one of two ways: by ordeal or by oath. Both of these types of proof 
were appeals to the supernatural. If the person performed his task adequately, God 
had rewarded him for his righteousness and he won his case. If he failed in his 
attempt, he had thus sworn falsely and was exposed to the wrath of God for his sin 
(Pollock vol. 2, p. 600). 
The ordeal involved, or was proceeded by, an oath that declared that the 
man performing the ordeal was innocent of any wrongdoing and should be the 
victor in the matter at hand. Some of these ordeals included trial by water, trial by 
iron, and trial by battle. In trial by water the person was thrown into the lake, if 
the person sank he was innocent and would be pulled out, but many times he died. 
In the trial by iron, a hot iron was placed in the person's hand, if a blister 
developed, the person was guilty. Finally, in the trial by battle, if the person 
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- survived the battle, he was innocent. In the proof by oath, the person had to swear 
an oath and then present a group of his neighbors as "oath-helpers" to support that 
his oath was tnle. There was thus no reason for the court to try to determine if the 
oath was true; the oath-helpers already had (Pollock vol.2, p. 601). 
Along with the concept of proof, the concept of pleadings became important 
to the development of the jury system. Proofs could not determine the facts 
surrounding the incident in question. They could only determine a persons guilt 
or mnocence. 
The ordeals, trial by battle, and to some extent 
wager of law, are all examples of the more 
primitive methods of proof. They could only 
decide general questions of guilt, or liability, 
or right, and were quite inappropriate to answer 
questions of law or to investigate the truth of 
specific facts (Baker 87). 
The object of pleadings was, and still is, to define the question in the dispute 
between the parties so that it can be tried and settled. As pleadings developed and 
narrowed disagreements down to single issues, a difference was noticed between 
matters of fact and matters of law. With this new realization came the knowledge 
that another method of determining them would have to be developed. 
Juries, as they evolved after the Norman Conquest, were commonly referred 
to as iurta, inquest, and assize. One must realize that this jury did not resemble 
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the present day concept of a jury. It still represented "the country" in its panel. A 
question was put to the countrymen of the vicinity where a cause of action or 
crime occurred on the belief that they would know something of the truth. The 
jurors were sworn to tell the truth drawing from their own knowledge of the crime. 
This was not done as an oath-helper would have done. The juror did not swear as 
to the party's oath, but instead swore that what he was going to report was what he 
knew or had learned through his own efforts. Though this is a fine line in some 
respects, it is important to the evolution of the jury system. Despite its inherent 
superiority over the other methods of proof, this form of jury still had many 
attributes of the proof. A party could prove his case by enough members of the 
jury swearing that a matter was true or false based on their own knowledge. The 
earliest jurors were not expected to come along and try cases by hearing evidence, 
they were simply to give their versions of the truth, much in the same way as 
witnesses do today. One difference was that jurors were expected to search out 
the truth within the community to bring back the correct answer of their findings 
to the court. It was a long and gradual process that brought about the change from 
proof by jury to trial by jury (Holdsworth vol. 1, p. 309). 
Henry II to date was the monarch who made the most extensive use of the 
jury in all governmental departments. Under the Assizes of Clarendon and 
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Northampton, he required juries to "answer as to persons suspected of crimes, as 
to escheats, as to outlaws, and as to the misdoings of officials" (Holdsworth, vol. 
1, p. 312). He sent these orders to all of the Curia Regis courts (both coram rege 
and in banco) to be implemented there. These juries were thus fulfilling the same 
roles that the hundreds and tithings traditionally had carried out. These juries also 
served to help create the system of common law. 
One of the most important instruments of the 
royal power was the inquisition held under the 
supervision of a royal judge by means of a jury. 
And wherever royal justice was introduced, this 
method of determining the facts accompanied it. 
Thus the jury system spread as rapidly and widely 
as the justice of the royal courts, and as the rules 
of common law which those courts were both 
making and administering (Holdsworth, vol. 1, . 
p.316). 
The system of inquiry by jurors was also used in the local courts for both 
administrative purposes and judicial purposes. This continued to hold true even 
after the rise of Parliament in the 14th century caused the central courts to focus 
mainly on judicial functions. Due to the special civil juries called assizes, this 
meant that the judicial functions of the central courts became chiefly criminal in 
nature. These evolving criminal juries helped to eventually create the jury as it is 
known today. 
16 
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As was already discussed, the duty of identifying and producing the persons 
guilty of each crime naturally fell upon the community. Under the Assize of 
Clarendon 1116 and Assize of Northampton 1176, the community was required to 
produce the offenders or face punishment (usually fines) themselves. After the 
discontinuance of ordeals in 1215, and with the severance of ecclesiastical and lay 
judicial procedures, the jury became the method of trial in criminal cases (Baker 
312). 
When the royal justices visited a county in their traveling (coram rege), the 
representatives of the town were expected to present suspects before them for 
judgment. These presentments would then be checked against the official record 
of crimes which was kept by the coroner, the king's official. Even after the 
traveling justices ceased to exist and permanent courts were established, the 
presentment continued to be the mode by which criminals were delivered to be 
judged. The "grand jury", which was supposed to represent all of the hundreds in 
the county, maintained its responsibility for the presentments until the eyers 
ceased. Once this occurred, it became the sheriff s responsibility to call a grand 
jury of the county together. This body mayor may not have represented each of 
the hundreds in the county, but they would still be persons familiar with the event 
in question. To this grand jury, the sheriff would pose a question as to whether 
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enough evidence was in the possession of the grand jury to suspect that the person 
in question had committed the crime. If enough evidence was believed to be 
present, the person was held over for trial by the justices; if not, he was released. 
The Grand jury scrutinized informations received by 
them in 'bills of indictment' to decide whether there 
was sufficient evidence to lay the matter before the 
justices. If the grand jurors considered that there was 
a case to answer, they found the bills 'true' by writing 
billa vera on the back; if not, they endorsed the bill 
'ignoramus' and proceedings ended. The finding of a 
true bill by the grand jury was not a judicial proceeding 
and did not imply guilt, only suspicion. Its effect was to 
initiate proceedings between the king himself and the 
accused person on the question of criminal guilt (Baker 
276). 
These proceedings between the king, or Curia Regis, and the accused 
person caused some problems for the justices after the ordeals were discarded. 
With the ordeals, the accused could be judged by a physical act that the justice 
could personally oversee. Without the ordeals, the decision had to be made based 
on facts and circumstances that had occurred outside the view of the justices. It 
became necessary to use "the country" in these proceedings as well, and it was 
from this development that the legal basis for jurors being given the responsibility 
of finding fact derives. 
Justices had the opportunity to develop this fact-finding right for 
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themselves, but they wanted to be able to continue to concentrate on the issues of 
law. From this right to find fact, or truth, comes the necessity of unanimity. 
Afterall, there could only be one truth in a situation. As all jurors were sworn by 
oath to find the truth, the fear that an "untruth" would be found was gone for God 
would punish oath-breakers. 
Originally a few members of the grand jury, who had presented the 
indictment of suspicion, were used to testify before the justices as to their 
findings. By the end of the 13th century, the regularization of this practice had 
produced the "petty" jury of twelve countrymen which was the only tribunal 
capable of deciding the guilt of a man accused through the process of indictment. 
By the end of the 14th century the members of the petty jury had to be different 
from the members of the grand jury. Ifa person seated as a petty juror had 
actually indicted the accused, the accused could have the juror "excepted", or 
challenged, from the jury (Baker 331). 
There were still no trials being played out before the jury in the 14th 
century. Jurors were still witnesses in nature and within their group there existed 
a sense of unity and community. They were regarded by some as fulfilling the old 
judicial functions of the suitors who were called upon to make judgments in the 
local courts. Jurors became judges of fact, which they are today, in the course of 
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medieval and Tudor times as the principles of testimony and verdicts were 
developed. By the middle of the 16th century, witnesses were summoned to 
testify before the jury and jurors were no longer supposed to use their private 
knowledge to decide cases. The Elizabethan judges would even void a judgment 
where a verdict was given after jurors had spoken privately to witnesses. It was 
not until the 17th century that the jury completely lost its character as witnesses, 
although the jury had been exhibiting the character of judge since the 14th 
century. It was not until the 18th century that an accused could produce his own 
sworn witnesses (Baker 89). 
After being indicted by the grand jury and upon being asked his plea, the 
accused would plead "not guilty" and would ask to be "put on the country" which 
was a request for a jury trial. At this time in history, if a person remained silent 
when asked his plea, it was construed as automatic conviction rather than a 
compulsory trial. There were great benefits to being tried by a jury: an accused 
could challenge, or except, up to 35 jurors without any reason and several more 
for a particular cause, and the final twelve jurors had to convict him unanimously 
(Holdsworth vol. 1, p. 313). 
This unanimous conviction was not as difficult as it would seem. Jurors, 
after hearing several cases before being given the chance to give a verdict, were 
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- required to remain together until a true verdict was reached. They were also not 
allowed any food or drink until their decision was made. Also, it was not until 
1670 with Bushel's case that jurors were no longer liable to be fined or punished 
for rendering an acquittal. Bushel's case also gave the jurors the ability to accept 
or reject witness testimony as true. Finally, the verdict of the jury came to be as 
inscrutable as a judgment of God and thus could not really be questioned. The 
only appeal for the convicted in regards to the jury was through attaint where a 
juror could be convicted of perjury for being corrupted. At no time during this 
development had the decision of fact been appealable. Only judicial, legal error 
by the judges could be appealed. 
The jury as seen here has, through common law, been both static and 
flexible. As ditIerent circumstances arose, the jury system could be 
accommodated to the situation. Under the rule of precedent and stare decisis, 
bedrock to the common law, the jury did not change much after these initial 
parameters were created until it came to America. 
As the English colonies developed in America, English law developed along 
with them. The jury system that came to America from England included a grand 
jury for indictment of a defendant, a twelve-man petty (petit) jury made up of 
white, property holders drawn from the local community to convict him, the 
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practice of challenging potential jurors for bias against the accused, verdict 
unanimity in order to convict, jurors who were finders of both fact and law, and a 
jury made up of persons with local knowledge. English magistrates carried 
English law to the colonies with the help of juries made up of colonists. As the 
colonists became dissatisfied with other aspects of English law, specifically 
taxation without representation, the break with England was imminent. 
Juries made up of colonists were one of the major forces of resistance to the 
English in the colonies. As American colonists, like John Hancock, were arrested 
and tried for breaking English law, American juries refused to convict in cases 
they felt were political in nature, like customs laws, rather than actual crimes. 
This jury defiance in civilian courts caused Hancock to be brought to trial and to 
be convicted for smuggling in the British Admiralty court where no local jury was 
used. In tum, Hancock sued the customs agents in the civil courts for trespass of 
his ship and was victorious with the local jury. In this way, the local jury was able 
to show its disdain for English law and resistance to its enforcement (Abramson 
9). 
One of the largest complaints in the colonies against the Stamp Act of 1765-
1766, aside from taxation without representation, was the use of trials in the 
admiralty courts without juries for those accused of failing to pay these taxes. In 
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answer to this complaint, English authorities began shipping defendants to 
England for jury trials there. To the colonists, this was uncalled for behavior. The 
Declaration of Independence itself placed threats to local juries and local trials on 
the list of grievances sparking revolution: "For transporting us beyond the Seas to 
be tried for pretended offenses and for depriving us in many cases, of the benefits 
of Trial by Jury." 
After the War for Independence and the failure of the Articles of 
Confederation, the Americans needed a new system of government and govern-
mental charter. As the U. S. Constitution was drafted and sent to the thirteen 
states for ratification in 1787, a huge debate ensued between the Federalists 
(supporters of the Constitution) and Anti-Federalists (supporters of state rights) 
concerning the kind of criminal jury system that the new government would have. 
Crucial to this debate was whether the local jury of the "vicinage" was impartial 
and whether impartiality was even necessary to insure justice. 
The Federalists and the Anti-Federalists were two groups, which were 
diametrically opposed to one another, that arose at the time of the creation of the 
U.S. Constitution. The Federalists were supporters of a strong central government 
and were the chief authors of the new constitution. The Anti-Federalists were 
staunch believers in States' rights and the rights of the people to oppose a strong 
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government. The Federalists feared a government that was too weak to create a 
solid nation with some degree of conformity in laws and practices. The Anti-
Federalists feared an over-bearing central government that would dictate rules, 
regulations, and policies to the States, and thus to the people, that would be 
abhorrent to the local communities. The Anti-Federalists also feared the loss of 
each particular state's individuality due to conforming to the central government. 
In the midst of this political debate over the strength of the central government and 
what rights the States retained, the question of the size of the jurisdiction from 
which jurors would be drawn in federal cases arose. 
The Constitution sent for ratification called for a jury to be created from the 
State in which the crime had occurred. The Anti-Federalists feared that this would 
take the matter out of the hands of the local jury which would be familiar with the 
case. They thought that cases that hinged on "whether the accused was habitually 
a good or bad man" (Abramson 27) could not be decided by a State-wide jury. 
Another fear was that a jury drawn from the entire State would not be able to 
decide cases based on the existing community standards of the vicinage in which 
the crime occurred. As Abramson states, "jury trials gave local residents, in 
moments of crisis, the last say on what the law was in their community" (25). One 
final Anti-Federalist fear was that of a strong overbearing government, and the 
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jury's ability to control it as it had done in the case of the perceived English 
tyrants. 
The power of the jury to defend against tyranny 
depended vitally on the principle that a central 
government would have to leave enforcement of 
its laws in the hands of the local population--a 
principle that the Anti-Federalists found sorely 
lacking in the proposed Constitution of 1787 
(Abramson 25). 
Federalists feared that a local jury would not be able to judge the evidence 
sufficiently on its own merit without being in some way biased from other 
information within the community. The Federalists felt that it was better in this 
case to be impartial--have no feelings about or prior knowledge about the case--in 
order to ensure the credibility of justice. The Federalists also argued that 
"vicinage" had no clear generally recognized definition and that to require the 
federal juries to be "of the vicinage" would create undue confusion and no 
national continuity of meaning or practice (Abramson 10). 
In the end, a compromise of sorts was reached, with the 6th Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution. It reads: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of 
the state and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law . 
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- In this way, the Anti-Federalists won by having the jury drawn from a pool 
smaller than the entire State, and the Federalists won by requiring an impartial 
jury and by getting to define "district" in later legislation. The Judiciary Act of 
1789 created federal courts inferior to the Supreme Court and mapped out judicial 
districts over which these courts would have jurisdiction. For instance, today 
there are over ninety federal district courts. The State of Indiana has two, one for 
the northern half of the state and a second one for the southern half. Let it be 
remembered, though, that the Constitution set up courts for the federal 
government; the states were still free to set up their own courts, with their own 
jury standards within the limits of the constitutional rights of defendants. 
Unknown to the Anti-Federalists in this whole mess was the knowledge that 
common law would serve to defeat what the Federalists could not--the local, 
knowledgeable jury. The presumption of bias in persons who knew about a case 
prior to a trial was not new in the 19th century. It was part of the jury's previous 
evolution from a self-informing body, in England, to a neutral body that listened 
to witnesses. The Anti-Federalists had found this bias to be a source of local 
autonomy, and pointed to its use in the American resistance as tantamount to 
America's current freedom. 
With the beginning of the 19th century, however, bias in jurors was 
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regarded in a different light. In the 1807 case, United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 
55, Aaron Burr was tried for treason. Aaron Burr was the former Vice-President 
of the United States under Thomas Jefferson who had forced a vote for the office 
of President in the House of Representatives when he and Jefferson tied for the 
number of electoral votes received in the election of 1800. Burr was arrested in 
1806 for planning an attempt to seize New Orleans to create an empire in the 
South separate from the 
U. S. In United States v. Burr, he complained that certain members of the jury 
who were friends of his enemy, President Thomas Jefferson, should be excused 
from the jury. The decision on this point sounded the death knell of the local 
knowledge jury model and outlined the portrait of the impartial juror. Chief 
Justice John Marshall ruled that if a person had expressed a decisive opinion on an 
"essential element" of the case, that he should be disqualified from serving as a 
juror. Ifhis knowledge was great but had not caused him to come to a definitive 
decision prior to the trial, he was still eligible. Marshall did say that first-hand 
knowledge was acceptable, but not information that was gained through the 
newspapers. In this way the problem of pre-trial knowledge thus became the 
problem of pre-trial pUblicity. 
The fear of pre-trial publicity today has caused many courts to allow 
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-massive amounts of challenging to dismiss knowledgeable persons from the jury. 
In the United States in the 1980s, estimates are that 3,100 defendants claimed that 
they could not impanel an impartial jury due to pre-trial pUblicity (Abramson 45). 
This is a complete tum-around from the jury of the past in which the very 
knowledge that qualified persons for jury duty then disqualifies people from 
serving today. 
Today, ideal jury impartiality can only be produced by disqualifying the 
most well-informed members of the community. This disqualification of 
individuals concerned with events within their community from jury duty does not 
tend to inspire confidence in the accuracy of, and responsibility involved in 
producing, jury verdicts. Chief Justice Marshall in 1807 set American law along 
the course that it has been following ever since, searching for jurors who are as 
free as possible from local information, which has come to be called "local 
prejudice", and disqualifying those concerned persons who know too much, 
regardless of whether or not they have reached a conclusion as to guilt or 
mnocence. 
Although the Federalists and Anti-Federalists disagreed over the issue of 
jury geography and the merits of impartiality, one thing they agreed upon was the 
importance of the jury. One must realize, however, that their concept of the jury 
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was one in which the jury had the right to decide both questions of fact and 
questions of law. Throughout the 18th century the prevailing view was that jurors 
"could ignore judges' instructions on the law and decide the law by themselves in 
both civil and criminal cases" (Abramson 30). Juries were afforded this right, 
because (1) they heard different versions of the law from the judge, the 
prosecuting attorney, and the defense attorney; and (2) they were the sole 
defenders of the standards of the local community. 
By the end of the 19th century, jurors were presumed to be ignorant of the 
law and were obligated to abide by the court's instructions on legal matters. 
Although some members of the jury at the beginning of the 19th century would 
have been familiar with law, most jurors would not have been. The credibility of 
the early 19th century jurors as finders of law came through their common sense 
ability to apply laws to the condition of the people of their community through 
their local knowledge. As local juries and jury bias became points of contention, 
jurors' ability to apply the law became questionable as well. In 1895 the Supreme 
Court in Spar/and Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 151, decisively rejected the 
right of criminal juries to judge the law. 
The jury entered the 19th century as a body authorized 
to resolve contested points of law on its own, even to 
refuse enforcement of laws considered unjust. The jury 
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exited the century duty-bound to follow judicial 
instructions and to enforce the law whether it agreed 
with it or not (Abramson 37). 
There is no question about it. Juries are finders of fact and judges are the 
sole finders of law. What happens to cases when a jury decides to disregard the 
judge's instruction of law in their finding of fact by finding a person innocent in 
spite of the law which shows his guilt? This process of overriding the law to find 
their own verdict is called jury nullification. Jury nullification has long been seen 
as a means of challenging an unjust law. In a sense, it invites the jury to not 
punish justified acts of lawbreaking. Martin Luther King, Jr. openly advocated 
- that persons had a "moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws." It seems only fair 
then that this principle should extend to juries. By overriding unjust laws, the 
community would be fulfilling a moral right of the individual to act in ways 
contrary to the law in matters of extreme importance. This form of nullification 
and overriding the law, however, has been used improperly in the South and other 
areas to acquit Ku Klux Klan members who murdered African-Americans 
(Abramson 61). Jury nullification cannot be condoned in such instances. 
However, criminal juries have the raw power to pardon lawbreaking because there 
is no device for reversing a jury that insists on acquitting a defendant against the 
law. A finding of a person guilty against the instructed law can be, and will be, 
-. 
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reversed by the judge. The same Bushel case mentioned in the evolution of the 
English jury is applicable here. In the Bushel case of 1670, Chief Justice Sir John 
Vaughn of the Court of Common Pleas found that jurors could never be fined or 
imprisoned for their verdicts. In this situation juries could never be punished for 
acquitting a defendant. This case established the power of the criminal jury to 
disregard the judge's instructions on law, and barring some sort of future penalty, 
it gives the jury complete power to determine guilt or innocence. 
Another aspect of the criminal jury that has led to difficulties in finding a 
defendant guilty has been the principle of jury unanimity in their verdict. The first 
instance of the demand for a unanimous verdict was in England in 1367 when the 
court refused to accept an 11-1 vote (Abramson 179). There was some use of a 
majority vote in the American colonies in the 17th century briefly, but these were 
because of unfamiliarity with common law procedures. It is safe to say that by the 
18th century and until 1972 there was no question of there being anything less 
than complete unanimity in a criminal conviction. 
In 1972 the Supreme Court dismissed the unanimous verdict requirement as 
a "historical accident" lacking any constitutional stature (Abramson 180). The 
Court concluded that eliminating the standard would not alter the function of the 
jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt with a super majority 
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vote necessary instead of unanimity. Jury verdicts would still represent minority 
views because deliberations would still take place. At the same time that the court 
was rejecting unanimity, it said that the number "twelve" for juries was related to 
history as well and that a smaller number of jurors would not hamper the core 
functions of the jury. The Court has ruled that six-member juries maintain enough 
variety to be representative of the community, but it has not recognized the ability 
to convict on a less than 6-0 vote. As it stands now, States have the ability to 
determine the size of juries and requirements for jury votes in the question of 
convictions. 
It is somewhat ironic that the Supreme Court ruled out unanimity in verdicts 
at the same time that it said that juries must be a body that is truly representative 
of the community. During these changes the Court did rule that potential-juror 
challenges due solely for matters of race or gender would no longer stand up in 
court as valid reasons for challenging. If unanimity was still required, the views 
of the minorities on the jury would be important to the deliberations, debate, and 
vote in determining guilt or innocence. By dealing the death blow to unanimity, 
critics claim that the voice of the minority was once again taken away. The 
majority can simply vote over the objections or concerns of the minority. 
In Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, the Supreme Court rejected the 
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argument that unanimity was essential to enforcement of the 6th Amendment right 
before a cross-sectional jury. In Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 369, the Supreme 
Court rejected the argument that a vote of9-3 violated the defendant's right to due 
process under the 14th Amendment to have his guilt proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The Court said that even though some jurors had doubt, a super majority 
had believed that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that due 
process was thus fulfilled. The Court went on to say in Johnson that the 
legislative history of the 6th Amendment originally had "by unanimous verdict" in 
it but that the Framers rejected it. They reasoned from this that it had never been 
the intention of the writers of the Constitution to make jury verdicts unanimous. 
Although unanimity may not be necessary according to the Supreme Court, 
there is a much stronger public faith in unanimous verdicts. At a time when the 
public is dissatisfied with jury acquittals in high-profile cases, the public's 
confidence in the quality and accuracy of jury verdicts is waning. It appears to the 
public that juries decide cases according to emotions, prejudice, and sympathy 
more than according to the law and evidence. It just may be that a non-unanimous 
verdict is what is needed to restore faith in the jury system and to override the 
votes of those jurors who refuse to be budged from their illogical positions based 
on emotion, prejudice, and sympathy. Other people have expressed interest in 
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- once again following England's lead injury reform by limiting the kinds of cases 
that civil juries may hear. To be able to limit the jurisdiction of the courts, though, 
the whole system would have to be changed. This is certainly not likely to happen 
any time soon, and its overall benefits are questionable. 
Even though there are problems with the current jury system, the system 
still works. It is the background existence of the right to a jury trial, and 
predictions about how juries would decide cases were they to get them, that drive 
the parties to settle or plea bargain in the first place. Without the unpredictability 
of the jury, our system would become a system truly based on law with no room 
- for human reasoning. There would no longer be a barrier between the accused and 
,-
the accuser or justice against unjust laws. 
The American jury system of today still resembles in many ways the 
English jury from which it sprang. The criminal system still employs the use of a 
grand jury to indict criminals to hold them over for trial. The American system 
insures that members of the petit (petty) jury are different than the ones on the 
grand jury. The American system, like the English one of old, allows for 
challenging of potential jurors that might be biased against the defendant. The 
jury in America today is still the only finder of fact, and members swear an oath to 
fulfill their duty to justice and the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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Although the Supreme Court has ruled that twelve-men juries and verdicts of 
unanimity are no longer necessary, most states still require them in criminal 
matters. 
It is amazing that a system that began with the Norman Conquest of 
England, which saw juries as witnesses, could give birth to a system that expects 
almost complete ignorance of the facts surrounding the case. Underlying both 
systems, though, was the "hands on" ability of the citizen to become involved with 
the government and justice. In no other situation was the citizen more directly 
involved in the administration of justice and the government. While other 
common bonds between the two juries--one of the past and the other of the 
present--have slipped away, the most important aspect of local input into 
governing has remained. As long as the civil jury continues to exist, the nation 
will be able to fulfill its duty, as defined in the Constitution, to protect its citizens 
from arbitrary law enforcement--something for which a few scruffy colonists once 
rebelled. 
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